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Hizbullah: The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon
According to Augustus Richard Norton, his pur-
pose for writing Hezbollah: A Short History is the
presentation of an “honest” as well as “more balanced
and nuanced account of this complex organization,”
which Norton calls “the leading Shi‘i political party
in Lebanon” (pp. 8, 186). While Norton’s book of-
fers no startling new insights, it provides a synopsis
of what is known about Hizbullah in a form that is
both compact and usually well written.
Nevertheless, there are many shortcomings. First,
in a book tailored to the nonspecialist reader, Nor-
ton has omitted a considerable number of histori-
cal events that are crucial to understanding subse-
quent Lebanese history. These include the seminal
Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, which carved the Ot-
toman Empire’s Arab lands into today’s contempo-
rary states. Furthermore, there is no discussion of
the Cairo Agreement and its annulment, which are
critical to any understanding of the changing rela-
tionship between the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO) and Lebanon’s Shi‘a.[1]
In addition, Norton’s transliterations of Arabic
and Farsi terms are quite inconsistent, a fact that of-
ten results in distortions. Furthermore, some of Nor-
ton’s transliterations are not simply unorthodox, but
constitute serious errors. For example, Norton refers
to Iran’s Supreme Leader as the rakbar (p. 90). Irre-
spective of which transliteration system one employs,
rahbar is always spelled with an “h,” not a “k.”
And the errors do not end there. In a photograph
appearing on page 64, Norton identifies the person
in the foreground as Sayyid ‘Abbas al-Musawi. It is
actually Shaykh Ragib Harb, Hizbullah’s most influ-
ential resistance leader in the south, who was assas-
sinated by Israeli forces on February 16, 1984, and
to whom the Open Letter, Hizbullah’s 1985 founding
document, is primarily dedicated. Sayyid ‘Abbas al-
Musawi was himself assassinated on Feb. 16, 1992
while returning from ceremonies marking the eighth
anniversary of Shaykh Ragib’s assassination. Any-
one researching Hizbullah should know the difference
between these two men.
Such factual errors are distressingly frequent in
Norton’s book. For example, Imam Musa al-Sadr
did not, as Norton implies, establish Harakat al-
Mahrumin (the Movement of the Deprived) on his
own (p. 19). Rather, al-Sadr joined with Greek
Catholic Archbishop Gre´goire Haddad in 1974 to
found Harakat al-Mahrumin in an attempt to allevi-
ate the suffering of Lebanon’s poor regardless of their
sectarian or ethnic affiliations. As such, the organi-
zation was initially open to persons from all sects. It
was not until after the outbreak of the civil war that
Harakat al-Mahrumin became a Shi‘ite-based move-
ment under the leadership of al-Sadr. Furthermore,
the principal aim of al-Sadr’s 1978 visit to Libya was
not “to attend ceremonies commemorating the ascent
of the Libyan leader”Muammar Qadhaffi to power (p.
21). In fact, al-Sadr’s trip was motivated by a desire
to end the Lebanese civil war. Having been informed
that Qadhaffi was funding militias on both sides of
the conflict, he planned to intercede with the Libyan
leader to stop this practice.
Norton’s statements about Iranian Supreme
Leader Ali Khamene’i and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani are also replete with errors. He asserts that
“as of November 2006, at least 60 percent of all
Lebanese [Shi‘ites] follow Sistani, with the rest fol-
lowing Fadlallah. Very few consider themselves ’im-
itators’ of Khamenei.” (p. 151). It is worth noting
that Khamene’i is the marja’ al-taqlid (official source
or authority of emulation) in the Islamic Republic
of Iran, and Hizbullah’s official marja’, not marja’i,
as Norton writes on page 100. On the same page,
Norton states that Khamene’i “gave his blessings” to
the party’s participation in the Lebanese electoral
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process, thereby reducing the complexity, flexibility,
and pragmatism of Shi‘ite jurisprudence to individual
whim. In point of fact, Hizbullah asked Khamene’i
to provide a formal legal opinion (istifta’ ) on the le-
gitimacy of contesting the 1992 elections. As soon
as Khamene’i authorized and supported (ajaza wa
’ayyada) participation, Hizbullah embarked on draft-
ing its election program.
Norton also fails to mention the national dialogue
sessions that spanned the period between March and
June of 2006. Given that the war broke out in July, it
is no coincidence that the last two sessions (June 8th
and 29th) were dedicated to the interrelated issues of
Lebanon’s defense strategy and the weaponry under
Hizbullah’s control.
Norton’s conclusion appears to serve as a
postscript, as it reads like a chronology of events
that occurred subsequently to those treated in the
main text. Numerous errors are found here as well.
First, Norton twice refers to General Michel Aoun’s
Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) as the “Free Politi-
cal Movement” (pp. 153, 175). Norton’s conclusions
about the FPM are equally mistaken, asserting that
“ ’Aounists’ and the Shi‘a share a profound sense
of victimization in what they see as a corrupt and
unresponsive political system” (p. 153). Although
the FPM and Hizbullah might share a sense of vic-
timization and disgust with corruption, such factors
are incidental. They are not central to the historic
ten-point Understanding between the two groups, let
alone to an alliance based on mutual interest. A more
plausible explanation is that the Christian national-
ists (FPM) and the Muslim nationalists (Hizbullah)
signed the aforementioned Understanding addressing
relations with Syria and a variety of other political,
economic, administrative, and security issues after
the unrest of February 5, 2006 threatened to ignite
a new civil war.
Only in the final pages of his conclusion does Nor-
ton begin to offer some analytical insights, albeit far
off the mark and contradictory. This applies to his in-
sistence that “half-solutions and compromise usually
prevail, just as they will likely prevail in the 2006
crisis” (pp. 157-158), as well as his forecast of the
current political deadlock’s resolution through “prag-
matic compromises” (p. 159). It is difficult to rec-
oncile this argument with Norton’s contention that
the FPM and Hizbullah are working “together to ex-
pand their share of power in significant measure at
the expense of the Sunni Muslims”(p. 153). Norton’s
account of the crisis’s unfolding is also in error: “Fol-
lowing the resignation of an allied Sunni member and
in conjunction with these demands [veto over all gov-
ernment measures], all five Shi‘i members of the gov-
ernment resigned from the cabinet”(p. 156). The five
Shi‘ite ministers actually resigned first, on November
11, 2006, to be followed a few days later by environ-
ment minister Jacob Sarraf, who happens to be Greek
Orthodox, not Sunni Muslim. Furthermore, Sarraf is
an ally of former President E´mile Lahoud, and thus
only indirectly allied with Hizbullah.
Finally, Norton’s book sometimes reads more like
a defense and justification, rather than a scholarly
analysis, of Hizbullah’s actions. For example, Norton
seems eager to exonerate Hizbullah for several acts of
terrorism, attributing these instead to Iran (p. 78).
Norton also takes care in his conclusion to endorse
Hizbullah’s position on the July 2006 war, asserting
that “it was utterly predictable that the Shi‘a would
emerge from the war as a mobilized, assertive, and
more militant community” (p. 158).
Despite its merits, Norton’s Hezbollah: A Short
History contains numerous errors of fact, interpre-
tation, and attribution. A prominent scholar like
Norton is expected to take more care with his text.
And Princeton University Press clearly failed to ex-
ercise due diligence in the editing and peer review
processes, thus failing both their author and their
readers. Sadly, one can only assume that the topical-
ity of this study’s subject matter prompted a rush to
publish, thus causing the imperatives of commerce to
trump those of scholarship.
Note
[1]. The Cairo Agreement (CA) was signed on
November 3, 1969 between Lebanon and the PLO
granting the latter license to launch attacks from
south Lebanon against Israel. The Lebanese parlia-
ment’s annulment of the CA and all its corollaries
were published in the Official Gazette on June 18,
1987 under law number 87/25.
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